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Abstract
In recent years Risk Analysis has become increasingly important for any kind of project for
both personnel and equipment safety assessments. Many divisional projects must respect the
rules imposed by the French regulatory authority (INB) and the requirements of applicable
international standards. This document proposes a systematic approach for the setting up of a
complete Risk Analysis, and it defines coherent steps to be undertaken in order to check the
achievement of the project safety goals. Several techniques are discussed, and some ST
projects to which they have been applied or are going to be applied are presented. The
proposed Risk Analysis structure should be associated and adapted to the different stages of
the design and allows the definition of safety requirements; it furthermore traces the
guidelines for qualitative and quantitative assessments.
21 INTRODUCTION
Risk Analysis is a wide and complex field, which follows the development of a system from its
conceptual birth to the end of its lifetime. It includes a number of techniques aiming to the
establishment of the safety-related requirements of a system and the evaluation of the risk connected to
the use of such system, keeping into account interactions with external systems and the possible
accidents.
All components and systems have to comply with various international standards and rules
imposed by the applicable norms (ISO, ASME, IEC, etc.), and all safety-related divisional and CERN
projects must respect the INB regulations. Most times, these standards do not establish a fixed path for
a safety analysis, or leave to the system developers a high number of degrees of freedom for what
concerns this topic.
The scope of this paper is to propose a subdivision of the phases of a Risk Analysis, and a
coherent set of techniques (sufficiently flexible to be adapted to different projects) that can allow the
analyzer to assess the risk related to the system under study and point out both weak points and
devices for risk reduction.
1.1 Applicability at CERN: some safety-related projects
Some groups in ST Division (ST/AA, ST/MO) have recently begun to develop a Risk Analysis process
associated to the project of a system. In particular, the Access Control & Machine Interlock Systems
(ACS, MIS) for LHC and SPS, as well as the CERN Safety Alarm and Monitoring (CSAM) System are
willing to follow a common path and test the reliability of their architecture by means of such a
process. This comes also out from the common applicability of the standard IEC-61508 (built up for
safety-related electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems).
Constraints and rules imposed by INB, given the recommendations (see [1]) concerning the LEP
Access Control System, will include:
• Make sure that any inhibition of a VETO signal can be rapidly pointed out;
• Show that no mechanical or electrical failure (related to elements ensuring redundancy) can
inhibit the locking of an access point or actions devoted to beam destruction after an
intrusion;
• Show that no mechanical or electrical failure (related to elements ensuring redundancy) can
inhibit the locking of the “safety-related machine equipment” and the related actions devoted
to forbid access in the case of change of the state of one of this equipment;
• Ensure physically independent pathways for the safety signals;
• Use auto-controlled PLC and signal the “imminent beam”.
1.2 Acceptability of risk
Risk is mathematically defined as:
CFR ⋅= , (1)
where:
• F = Frequency; it represents the number of times an event takes place during a certain period and
is expressed in [no. of occurrences/time].
• C = Consequence; it quantifies the effects of an accident according to the different aspects to be
taken into account (people, equipment, money…) and can be expressed in [damage/occurrence],
“damage” being a quantification of any considered loss (loss of life, injuries, loss of money,
downtime…).
• R = Risk; it can represent either a collective risk (expressed in [damage/time]) or an individual
risk (expressed in [damage/person/time]), depending on the kind of consequence considered.
3Risk perception is heavily subject to factors very difficult to be quantified, such as politics,
society features, people’s perception, history of accidental events, etc.
The tolerable risk is the accepted risk in a given context based on the current characteristics of
society; it can be estimated by means of several methods (ALARP, limit curve, etc.), and should be
clearly defined before starting the project. The risk associated to one or more accidents related to any
system must be kept below the fixed threshold. [2],[3],[4]
2 OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSIS PROCESS
As a general statement, it is important to stress that Risk Analysis does not have a fixed layout, but
must be modeled and adapted to the particular system under study. It is convenient to sub-divide the
risk analysis process in three main phases, according to the state of the project (see Annex 1 and next
sections): Concept, PRA and Reliability analysis.
2.1 Basic rules and guidelines
A Risk Analysis should be systematic and flexible to cover all aspects related to safety, iterative to
ensure that the risk assessment evolves in parallel with changes in architecture or projects, and
conservative to avoid under-estimation of consequences or probabilities of an accident.
The following general safety-related features should characterize a system (electrical, electronic,
network, mechanical, etc.):
• Redundancy: more than one path (electronic, mechanical…) should be available for the most
important (or safety-related) exchanged fluxes (electrical signals, fluids/gases, protocols…);
• Physical independence: the most important communication ways, redundant paths (pipes, cables,
networks, power supplies, etc.) or elements (racks, gas containers, etc.) should be physically
located in remote places, in order to avoid or minimize common-cause failures and “domino-
effects” (i.e. the propagation of an accident to adjacent elements);
• Passivity: whenever possible, the safety systems should act in a passive way, i.e. they play their
role without the need for an intervention of other systems or the undertaking of other actions,
which may be affected by their own failures;
• Fail-safe technology: any failure and, wherever possible, any chain of faults should result in a safe
situation, avoiding the evolution of the accident in a worse scenario.
3 CONCEPT PHASE
This is perhaps the most delicate phase of the project. From how the system is basically conceived and
from which functions it is demanded to satisfy, it depends a big percentage of a good result in the final
product.
During this phase, the general capabilities, functions and main objectives of the system are
decided and linked together. Therefore, at this stage no quantitative estimations of the risk are
possible.
3.1 Objectives and expected results
The main objectives of this phase mostly concern the functional point of view, as a definitive
architecture has not been fixed yet.
In this context, the operational modes of the system must be specified, as well as the links
between the modes and the relationships with other systems. Once a functional scheme of the system is
established, the safety-related functions should be pointed out, these being the zones in which highest
care must be taken while designing the architecture. Finally, a list of safety requirements should
complete the preliminary part of the study and prepare the path for the following phase.
An External Functional Analysis (FA) and an application of the ALARP model for Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) allocation and Undesired Event prevision (see 3.2 and 3.3) has been performed
for the CSAM system ([4],[5]). A similar study will be realized for the ACS-MIS systems of LHC.
43.2 Functional Analysis
The Functional Analysis (FA) allows clarifying system’s functions and links with other systems. It is
also useful to point out the “borders” of the system (what can be considered inside/outside, what is
under its control, what is influenced…). The FA is divided into External and Internal FA, and depends
on the foreseen operational modes of the system.
One of the possible methods for the External FA is the MISME (see [5] and [6]), which points
out the connections (main functions or constraints) between the system and external elements. The
Internal FA allows a finer system specification and helps in pointing out the technical functions, that
is to say those describing in details the main functions identified in the External FA. This approach
also allows the definition of interfaces and fluxes exchanged between the single parts of the system.
3.3 Safety requirements
The safety requirements should summarize the information achieved during the whole Concept Phase
and establish a list of safety-related conditions the system (or its sub-parts) should respect. Their major
scope is to trace limits and thresholds not to be exceeded.
It is convenient to individuate “a priori” the Undesired Events (UE, accidents or main
degradations which may affect the system during its lifetime), estimate their consequences and
therefore assess an acceptable frequency (probability of occurrence per time) so that the associated risk
becomes tolerable, following the ALARP model (“As Low As Reasonably Practicable”, see
[3],[4],[5],[7],[8]).
Alternatively or for completeness, a similar technique can be applied to safety functions of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic systems (following the International Standard IEC –
61508). The method consists in negating the function (thus degrading the system), estimate the
consequences and find out the Safety Integrity Level (SIL, see [4] and [7]), that is to say the failure
probability per units of time or per demand, required for that function. SIL 1 indicates low-availability
systems, SIL 4 refers to strongly reliable systems.
As great uncertainty affects safety considerations at this stage, very conservative assumptions
must be made. In particular, when estimating the consequences of an accident related to the system,
both local effects and those on the whole process (i.e. on LHC, the tunnel, the experiences, the
personnel, the environment…) should be considered.
4 “PRA” PHASE
The Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) is a phase in which all of the remaining safety-related
information from the qualitative point of view must be provided. The techniques described below
require either a precise functional architecture of the system (thus a Functional Analysis, realized in
the previous phase, becomes very useful), or a component-like scheme.
4.1 Objectives and expected results
The main objectives of this phase are still related to a qualitative approach, but add much more detail
than what has been gained in the Concept Phase.
In particular, the hazards (or major accidents) related to deviations to process, bad working of a
function, functional unit or to the failure of a component should be pointed out. These techniques
allow finding out which are the accidents that may most likely affect the system and where they are
probably going to be located, in such way that any weak point is immediately detected. A list of
“Initiating Events” (single failures or events which, after a chain of other events, may lead to a hazard)
should also be prepared. At the end, a series of safety recommendations should already be able to
significantly improve the system and fix the major problems. If, after the PRA, no suitable technical
architecture is envisaged, structural changes should be applied to the project from the very beginning
(functional architecture), thus iterating the process.
A PRA study (probably a HazOp, see 4.2) will be performed for the ACS-MIS systems of LHC.
54.2 Techniques for preliminary assessments
HazOp (Hazard and Operability analysis) is a systematic technique aiming to analyze the system from
a functional point of view. It is also possible to sub-divide the system in units (i.e. gas supply unit,
ventilation, transmission…) and then apply the technique, given that the parameters exchanged
between the units are known (see also 3.2). A list of so-called “key words” referring to abnormal
working (“No”, “Less of”, “More of”, “Other than”, etc.) is applied to the detected parameters in order
to inspect the behavior of the system. Causes and consequences, both locals, on the whole plant and on
other connected systems are analyzed.
A qualitative evaluation of risk (by means of previously tables such as described in
[3],[4],[5],[7] or [8]) is suggested or required, thus three columns (Frequency, Consequence and Risk)
are usually added on the right of the HazOp table. The technique must be repeated for each sub-zone
(if any) and for each foreseen operational mode of the system.
FMECA (Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis) is based on the same conceptual idea as
HazOp, but checks the system from the point of view of components, thus needing a technical
architecture description. The functional units of HazOp are replaced by the single components, and the
“keywords” are replaced by the failure modes of each component.
HazOp and FMECA are “single-failure” techniques, that is to say they suppose that only the
considered deviation to process occurs, and do not analyze the consequences of multiple simultaneous
faults, but are “systematic” as they consider all of the possible deviations from normal working. These
two methods are complementary, but usually only one of them is required for a PRA. [2],[3]
5 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
This last phase can be considered as the inner core of the whole safety process. It is during this period
that the possible accidents are deeply analyzed, consequences are estimated as precisely as possible
(“deterministic” analysis), and probabilities or frequencies are quantified in order to make the
calculation of associated risk possible.
5.1 Objectives and expected results
The objective of this phase is to give a validation to the system from a safety point of view, thus
ensuring that both all the safety functions are implemented and the risk associated to accidents is
acceptable. An iterative process will allow the implementation of necessary changes and corrections.
Such work includes a quantitative estimation of the probability of the occurrence of a certain
accident, or of the failure of a system. This can represent the unavailability or unreliability of such
system, depending on the mathematical method used. A quantitative estimation of the frequency of a
series of accidental sequences starting from a certain class of Initiating Events would also be useful
(thus using the Event Trees), as well as an dynamic analysis on the possible states and transitions of
the system (Markov Graphs, Petri Nets, see 5.3).
A Fault Tree – method (see 5.2) will be adopted for the ACS-MIS systems for LHC. The
possibility of coupling it to Event Trees, as well as of applying a Markov graphs/Petri nets study, as
well as will be investigated.
5.2 Fault Trees and Event Trees
The Fault Trees (FT) are probably the most known quantitative method for Risk Analysis. They are a
deductive, systematic technique that allows the splitting up of a systemic event into basic, elementary
events whose reliability characteristics and data are known. In this way, it becomes possible to
estimate the probability of the so-called “Top Event” (TE, usually the negation of one of the
system’s/sub-system’s functions). The technique refers to single systems and components and aims to
get numerical data.
The FT makes use of logic gates (OR, AND, etc.) and the basic requisite for its validity is that
the undeveloped events at which the splitting up stops must be independent one from the other. This is
a static technique, that is to say does not allow the analysis of the transition between one state and
6another, but is also multiple-failure, allowing the inspection of various degraded configurations of the
system. If coupled with the Event Trees, the FT can be considered as a dynamic technique.
The Event Trees (ET) are a logical technique which allows pointing out the possible accidental
sequences starting from a certain Initiating Event (IE), practically describing the evolution of a single
accident depending on the good working or failure of the foreseen protection systems. Before the
realization of the ET, the analyzer should group the IEs into separate class, putting together those that
are likely to give rise to the same accidental sequences. Given certain conditions (see [2]), to each
branch of an ET a Fault Tree concerning a system or safety/redundant sub-system can be attached
(“Fault Tree Linking”).
At the end, quantitative results (unavailability, unreliability, expected number of failures, etc.)
can be output, if some basic data are introduced (failure rates, repair rates, etc.). [2],[3],[9]
5.3 Importance analysis and other techniques
The Importance or Criticality analysis is one of the most useful methods to inspect a system and
decide which zones need an improvement. The most critical components are those for which a little
improvement brings great benefits on the reliability/availability of the whole system. The method
basically consists in calculating an index for each component, depending on its reliability parameters,
and comparing all indices. Higher values indicate a higher criticality, thus meaning where an
intervention should be undertaken. [2],[3]
A number of other techniques are available for quantitative Risk Analysis. In recent years, great
importance has been given to dynamic techniques (such as Markov Graphs and Petri Nets), that is to
say methods capable of representing the behavior of a system as time goes by, and of simulating its
transitions from a state to another. [2],[3],[9]
5.4 Software tools
A large number of software tools are available for each step of a Risk Analysis. For its simplicity and
completeness, one of the most interesting is Stars Studio 2000 (JRC Ispra, Italy). It allows the creation
of taxonomies and graphics, and contains tools for HazOp, FMECA, Fault Trees and Event Trees. All
of the tools contain user-friendly commands and links.
Other software tools, even more complete but generally more complicate (often containing cost
estimation, Monte Carlo simulations, databases, etc.) are for example Risk Spectrum’s PSA
Professional (Sweden), Item Software’s various tools (UK-USA), SOFIA (Sofreten, France), Aralia
Workshop and GRIF (Ixi, France).
The cost of a software package containing a set of Risk Analysis tools generally oscillates
between 10 and 40 kEuro, with an annual maintenance cost of 15-50% of the total license cost.
6 CONCLUSIONS
A Risk Analysis approach such as the one proposed by this paper can ensure the respect of
international rules and norms like INB constraints, given the degrees of freedom in choosing the most
suitable method for the system under study. Given the experience in the LEP Access Control System
safety assessment, and providing that enough information on the system and proper software are
available, the effort necessary for a complete study of the LHC Access Control System is estimated to
fall in a range in between one and two man-years.
The number of components, architectural complexity and scope of the system should turn
analyzers towards a certain set of techniques in spite of others. For example, the more the system is
complex, the more grouping sets of components into functional blocks will avoid (especially during
the PRA) dispersive or time-wasting cataloguing work. Generally speaking, a good conceptual study
or Functional Analysis, a HazOp or FMECA and a FT (if necessary, coupled with ET) technique can
guarantee a reasonably good result for a Risk Analysis.
It is for this reason that the group ST/AA has chosen to organize such a process in parallel with
the development of the Access Control & Machine Interlock Systems, both for LHC and SPS.
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8ANNEX 1
Figure 1: Layout of the Risk Analysis process with respect to system development
Phases of the Risk Analysis Stage of the project
• Functions of the system are defined
• Relationships with other systems are
defined
• User and Safety Requirements defined
• Point out safety functions
(Functional Analysis)
• Safety requirements
• Generic safety recommendations
CONCEPT
• A functional architecture is established
• One or more technical solutions and
detailed architectures are proposed
• A maintenance politics is decided
• Qualitative dysfunctional analysis
• Hazard identification and
localization
• Detailed safety statements
PRA
(Preliminary Risk Assessment)
Achieved: Functional architecture, Safety requirements
Is the risk acceptable?
END
• An architecture is chosen, some
technical degrees of freedom are still
possible
• System is submitted to validation tests
• Project is completed
• Quantitative dysfunctional
analysis, risk evaluation
• Analysis of probabilities and
consequences of accidents
• Validation and corrective actions
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Is there a suitable architecture
amongst the propositions?
Achieved: Architecture, Maintenance politicsYES
NO
YES
Limited corrections
Structural
corrections
NO
